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Crooks push Mac malware through fake OpenAI Codex ads

Sponsored search results lead developers straight into a ClickFix malware trap

The Register

Publisher

Aug 25, 2026 at 9:15 AM UTC · 2 분 소요

Crooks push Mac malware through fake OpenAI Codex ads
Image via The Register
번역 중…

security

Crooks push Mac malware through fake OpenAI Codex ads

Sponsored search results lead developers straight into a ClickFix malware trap

Cybercrims are using fake OpenAI Codex download pages to trick Mac developers into running malware disguised as installation commands.

Researchers at Cato Networks uncovered the campaign after spotting sponsored Google search results targeting people looking to download Codex for macOS. The ads direct would-be users to a convincing-looking download page hosted on Google Sites, complete with the familiar OpenAI branding. There is, however, no Codex waiting at the other end.

Instead of serving up an installer, the fake site tells Mac users to open Terminal, paste in a supplied command, and run it. The instructions are dressed up as part of the installation process, but the command quietly kicks off a multi-stage malware infection.

It's a variation of the increasingly popular "ClickFix" technique, in which attackers convince victims to execute malicious commands themselves rather than relying on a dodgy attachment or executable to do the dirty work.

In this case, the command begins with what appears to be a legitimate npm instruction for installing Codex. Tacked onto it, however, is code that decodes a Base64-encoded URL, fetches an attacker-controlled shell script and pipes it into zsh.